In the paper, cooperative two-stage network games are studied. On the first stage of the game players form a network, while on the second stage players choose their behaviors according to the network realized on the first stage. As a cooperative solution concept in the game the core is considered. It is proved that some imputations are time-inconsistent, whereas one can design time-consistent imputation distribution procedure for them. Moreover, strong time-consistency is also considered.
Introduction
In the present paper we analyze how mutual links connecting players can impact on players' behavior. Such links define a network. We consider a two-stage game in which players form a network on the first stage, and on the second stage players choose their controls. Such a network game is considered in a strategic setting, and following 7 a strategy of a player is a rule that uniquely defines his behavior on both stages of the game (player's behavior on the second stage depends on the network formed on the first stage).
We suppose that payoff of each player depends on his behavior on the second stage and behavior of his "neighbors" in a network formed on the first stage of the game.
Similar setting, modeled with a two-stage network game, was considered in 3, 5 . In the mentioned papers authors consider the model in which on the first stage players form a network, and on the second stage players are involved in a 2 × 2 coordination game which is the same for all players.
Our model is based on papers studying mechanisms of network formation, its evolution during the game as well as papers studying allocation rules and its properties for a fixed network 1, 2, 3 . Thus, in 1 the Nash network is considered as a solution in the strategic setting, and the network evolution is modeled as a convergent stochastic process. In 11 the network evolution is constructed as the result of players' actions, and the solution is considered in the sense of subgame perfectness. In 2, 6 solution concepts in network games are studied regardless of the network formation.
In the mentioned above papers the problem of time-consistency was not studied. The time-inconsistency problem was initiated in 8 for cooperative differential games, and later in 10 a special mechanism of stage payments-imputation distribution procedure-was designed to overcome time-inconsistency of cooperative solution concepts. It was also shown that the time-inconsistency problem arises not only in cooperative differential games but in other classes of cooperative dynamic games. In 12 it was shown that such problem arises in cooperative two-stage network games, in particular, is was proved that the Shapley value is time-inconsistent. In the present paper we show that other cooperative solutions-the core, the τ-value-are time-inconsistent. We also investigate more strict property of cooperative solution concepts-the strong time-consistency property.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the formalization of a two-stage network game is given. In Section 3 the cooperative model is considered assuming that players jointly choose behaviors on both stages to maximize the sum of their payoffs. Here we additionally consider the case of choosing behaviors jointly only on the second stage, provided the network on the first stage is fixed. Questions of time-consistency and strong time-consistency of cooperative solution concepts are investigated in Section 4. In Section 5 we consider a numerical example, and this section concludes the paper.
The Model
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a finite set of players who can interact with each other. Such interaction between two players means the existence of link connecting them and, therefore, communication between them. On the contrary, the absence of link connecting players means the absence of any communication between the players. Under these assumptions cooperation of players is said to be restricted by communication structure (or a network). Therefore, in such model we can use a technique of network games, in which the primary element is the network. A pair (N, g) we call a network. Here N is a set of its nodes (and it coincides with the set of players), and g ∈ N × N is a finite set of links. If an element (i, j) ∈ g, it means that there is a link connecting players i and j, and, therefore, generating communication of the players in the network. Below to simplify our notations, we will identify the network with its set of links denoting as g, and a link (i, j) in the network we will denote as a pair i j. In our setting we suppose that all links are indirect, so i j = ji.
Consider a two-stage problem. On the first stage each player chooses his partners-other players with whom he wants to form links. After choosing partners and establishing links, players, thereby, form a network. On the second stage having the network formed, each player chooses a control influencing his payoff. Consider the problem in details.
First Stage: Network Formation
Having the player set N given, define the link formation rule in the standard way: links, and, therefore, a network, are formed as a result of players' simultaneous choices.
Let M i ⊆ N \ {i} be the set of players whom player i ∈ N can offer a mutual link, and a i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1} be the maximal number of links which player i can maintain (and, therefore, can offer).
Behavior of player i ∈ N on the first stage is an n-dimensional profile g i = (g i1 , . . . , g in ) which components are defined as:
subject to the constrain:
The condition g ii = 0, i ∈ N excludes loops from the network, whereas the condition (2) shows that the number of possible links is limited. If M i = N \ {i}, player i can offer a link to any player, whereas if a i = n − 1, he can maintain any number of links.
A set of all possible behaviors of player i ∈ N on the first stage satisfying (1)-(2), denote by G i . The Cartesian product i∈N G i is the set of behavior profiles on the first stage. We suppose that players choose their behaviors on the first stage simultaneously and independently from each other. In particular, player i ∈ N chooses g i ∈ G i , and as a result the behavior profile (g 1 , . . . , g n ) is formed.
Under our assumptions having the behavior profile (g 1 , . . . , g n ) formed, an undirect link i j = ji is established in network g if and only if g i j = g ji = 1, i.e. g consists of mutual links which were offered only by both players.
Consider a simple example.
Example 2.1. Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and players choose the following behaviors on the first stage: g 1 = (0, 1, 1, 1), g 2 = (1, 0, 1, 0), g 3 = (1, 1, 0, 0), g 4 = (0, 0, 1, 0). The resulting network g contains three links {12, 13, 23}.
Second Stage: Choosing Control
Having formed the network, players choose their behaviors on the second stage. Define neighbors of player i in network g as elements from the set N i (g) = { j ∈ N \ {i} : i j ∈ g}. Assuming that network g may be not profitable for players, allow them to break formed links.
Define components of an n-dimensional profile d i (g) as follows:
1, if player i does not break the link formed on the first stage with player j ∈ N i (g) in network g, 0, otherwise.
It is obvious that profile (d 1 (g), . . . , d n (g)) affects network g formed on the first stage by removing some links: profile (d 1 (g), . . . , d n (g)) applied to network g changes its structure and forms a new network, denoted by g d . Network g d is obtained from g by removing links i j such that either
Moreover, on the second stage player i ∈ N chooses control u i from a finite set U i . Then, behavior of player i ∈ N on the second stage is a pair (d i (g), u i ): it defines, on the one hand, links to be removed d i (g), and, on the other hand, control u i .
Both new network g d and controls u i , i ∈ N, define a payoff function K i of player i, which, according to the game rules, depends on player's behavior on the second stage as well as behavior of his neighbors in network g d . More formally, K i (u i , u N i (g d ) ), i ∈ N, is non-negative real-valued function defined on the set U i × j∈N i (g d ) U j . Here u N i (g d ) denotes chosen controls u j of all player i's neighbors j ∈ N i (g d ) in network g d . Assume that functions K i , i ∈ N, satisfy the following property: (P): for any two networks g and g and player i if
Let network g be realized on the first stage. Consider two behaviors of player i ∈ N on the second stage: (d i (g), u i ) and (d i (g), u i ). Here d i (g) differs from d i (g) in that player i removed more links from network g using d i (g) than using d i (g), constituting a profile (d 1 (g), . . . , d n (g)). Denote a network, formed from network g, by profile
, and player i's payoff decreases as the total number of links decreases. Therefore, his behavior on the second stage (d i (g), u i ) is dominated by behavior (d i (g), u i ).
Cooperation in Two-Stage Network Games
The remaining part of paper will be devoted to study the cooperative case in which we answer three main questions: what is a cooperative solution in the game? Can it be realized in the game? Is it strongly time-consistent? To answer all these questions, first we consider and analyze an additional case which results can be used.
Two-Stage Network Game: Cooperation on the Second Stage
In this section we suppose that players' behavior profile (g 1 , . . . , g n ), g i ∈ G i , i ∈ N, which is chosen on the first stage, is fixed, and it forms network g. On the second stage players jointly choose n pairs (
Following 12 , we obtain the result.
Proposition 3.1. The maximal sum of players' payoff can be calculated by the formula:
. Since payoff functions K i , i ∈ N, satisfy the property (P), the removal of any link i j ∈ g decreases payoff of N, and, therefore, components of profiles d * i (g), i : N i (g) ∅ consist of ones, and they do not change network g on the second stage as well as the set of players' neighbors (N i (g d ) = N i (g)). Thus, we have
that proves (4).
Next problem is to allocate the maximal sum of players' payoffs among the players. After the allocating procedure, the game ends.
To allocate the maximal sum of players' payoffs we construct an auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N, v(g)). The characteristic function v(g) in this game is defined for any subset S ⊆ N-a coalition-as follows:
, v(g, ∅) = 0, subject to network g is fixed.
In general, v(g, S ) is defined in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern as the maximal payoff that coalition S can guarantee itself (the maxmin value) in a zero-sum game between two players: coalition S , maximizing its payoff, and its complement N \ S , minimizing its payoff, provided that network g is fixed.
Proposition 3.2. If payoff functions K i , i ∈ N, are non-negative and satisfy the property (P), the maximal payoff that coalition S can guarantee itself is calculated by formula:
Proof. The maxmin value for coalition S ⊂ N is defined as:
.
Here, obviously, the maximum operation is taken over behavior of players from coalition S , and the minimum operation is taken over behavior of players from its complement N \ S . Since the presence of link i j ∈ g, i ∈ S , j ∈ N \ S , increases payoff of coalition S according to the property (P), rather than its absence, therefore, player j ∈ N \ S , as a neighbor of i, changes his component in d j (g) from 1 to 0, i.e. removes link i j to minimize the payoff of coalition S . Thus, to minimize the value i∈S K i (u i , u N i (g d ) ) players from N \ S remove all links with players from S . In this case player i's neighbors, i ∈ S , are players from the set N i (g d ) ∩ S , and his payoff does not depend on u j , j ∈ N \ S , since any link i j ∈ g, i ∈ S , j ∈ N \ S is removed. Therefore,
Moreover, the removal of link i j ∈ g, i, j ∈ S reduces the payoff of coalition S , thus, to maximize the value i∈S K i (u i , u N i (g d )∩S ), links between players from S are not changed, and also player i's neighbors are become players from the set N i (g) ∩ S . Then we obtain max ( 
This proves the statement.
Note that under our assumptions values v(g, S ), S ⊂ N, can be calculated as a solution of a maximization problem which is simpler than solving the maxmin problem in general case.
For a singleton {i}, its value is defined in the following way:
and it does not depend on the network. An imputation is an n-dimensional profile ξ(g) = (ξ 1 (g), . . . , ξ n (g)), satisfying both the efficiency condition and the individual rationality condition:
The set of all imputations in the game (N, v(g)) we denote by I(v(g)).
A cooperative solution concept in the auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N, v(g)) with fixed network g is a rule that uniquely assigns a subset CS C(v(g)) ⊆ I(v(g)) to the game (N, v(g)). For example, if the cooperative solution concept is the core C(v(g)), then
Two Stage Network Game: Cooperation on Both Stages
Suppose now that players jointly choose their behaviors on both stages of the game. Acting as one player and choosing g i ∈ G i , u i ∈ U i , i ∈ N, the grand coalition, N, maximizes the value:
Let the maximum be attained when players' behavior profiles g * i , u * i , i ∈ N are chosen, and profile (g * 1 , . . . , g * n ) forms network g * . Here as well as in (4) to maximize the sum of players' payoffs from N, players should not remove links from the network, therefore, all components of profiles d i (g), i : N i (g) ∅ are equal to 1 for any network g. Let
Again to allocate the maximal sum of players' payoffs according to some imputation, we construct an auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N, V) . The characteristic function V is defined in a way similar to one considered in Subsection 3.1.
The proposition below directly follows from Propositions 3.1-3.2.
Proposition 3.3. In the cooperative two-stage network game the superadditive characteristic function V(·) in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern is defined as:
,
An imputation in the cooperative two-stage network game is an n-dimensional profile ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ), satisfying
The set of all imputations in the game (N, V) we denote by I(V).
A cooperative solution concept in the auxiliary cooperative TU-game (N, V) is a rule that uniquely assigns a subset CS C(V) ⊆ I(V) to the game (N, V) . For example, if the cooperative solution concept is the core C(V), then
Time-Consistent and Strongly Time-Consistent Cooperative Solutions
Suppose that at the beginning of the game players jointly decide to choose behavior profiles g * i , u * i , i ∈ N to maximize the sum (6), and then allocate it according to a specified cooperative solution concept CS C(V) which realizes an imputation ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ). It means that in the cooperative two-stage network game player i ∈ N should receive the amount of ξ i as his payoff. What will happen if after the first stage (after choosing the profiles g * 1 , . . . , g * n ) players recalculate the imputation according to the same cooperative solution concept? The behavior profile g * 1 , . . . , g * n on the first stage forms network g * , therefore, after recalculation of the imputation (according to the same cooperative solution concept as ξ), players' payoffs will be ξ i (g * ), i ∈ N based on values of characteristic function v(g * , S ) for all S ⊆ N.
Definition 4.1. An imputation ξ ∈ CS C(V) is said to be time-consistent if there exists an imputation ξ(g * ) ∈ CS C(v(g * )) such that the following equality holds for all players:
A cooperative solution concept CS C(V) is time consistent if any imputation ξ ∈ CS C(V) is time-consistent.
The equality (7) means that if we choose a cooperative solution concept CS C(V) on the first stage and according to it calculate an imputation ξ, defining players' payoffs, and then on the second stage recalculate players' payoffs according to the same cooperative solution concept CS C(v(g * )), i.e. calculate a new imputation ξ(g * ), subject to formed network g * , players' payoffs will not change. Since in most games the condition (7) is not satisfied, the timeconsistency problem arises: player i ∈ N, who initially expected his payoff to be equal to ξ i , can receive different payoff ξ i (g * ). To avoid such situation in the game, we propose a stage payments mechanism-imputation distribution procedure 10 for ξ. Definition 4.2. Imputation distribution procedure for ξ in the cooperative two-stage network game is a matrix
The value β ik is a payment to player i on stage k = 1, 2. Therefore, the following payment scheme is applied: player i ∈ N on the first stage of the game receives the payment β i1 , on the second stage of the game he receives the payment β i2 in order to his total payment received on both stages β i1 + β i2 would be equal to the component of allocation ξ i , which he initially wanted to get in the game as the payoff. 
It is obvious that time-consistent imputation distribution procedure for ξ = (ξ 1 , . . . , ξ n ) in the cooperative two-stage network game can be defined as follows:
In case of the cooperative solution concept CS C(V) assigns multiple allocations (for example, the core), more strict property of imputation distribution procedure can be used-the strong time-consistency property.
Definition 4.4. An imputation ξ ∈ CS C(V) is said to be strongly time-consistent if the following inclusion is satisfied:
A cooperative solution concept CS C(V) is strongly time-consistent if any imputation ξ ∈ CS C(V) is strongly timeconsistent.
Therefore, the core C(V) is strongly time-consistent if C(v(g * )) ⊆ C(V). Unfortunately, for strongly time-consistent imputation distribution procedures it is impossible even to derive formulas similar to (8) .
where a ⊕ A = {a + a : a ∈ A, a ∈ R n , A ⊂ R n }.
Note, that strongly time-consistent imputation distribution procedure β for an imputation from the core C(V) satisfies the inclusion:
Numerical Example
As an illustration consider a three-person game with some restrictions on players' behaviors: each player can maintain only one link; Player 3 can offer a link only to Player 1. Under these restrictions we have: the set of players N = {1, 2, 3}; subsets of players to whom each player can offer a link are M 1 = {2, 3}, M 2 = {1, 3}, M 3 = {1}; a number of links each players can maintain: a 1 = a 2 = a 3 = 1. Therefore, on the first stage sets of players' behaviors are: G 1 = {(0, 0, 0); (0, 1, 0); (0, 0, 1)}, G 2 = {(0, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0); (0, 0, 1)}, G 3 = {(0, 0, 0); (1, 0, 0)}, and only three networks can be formed on the first stage of the game: the empty network (the network without links, g = ∅), g = {12}, and g = {13}.
Suppose that sets of controls U i on the second stage for any network g, realized on the first stage, are the same U 1 = U 2 = U 3 = {A, B}, and payoff functions are defined as:
Consider the case of cooperation on both stages. In this case the maximal value
and it can be reached if players choose the following behaviors: g * 1 = (0, 0, 1), g * 2 = (0, 0, 0), g * 3 = (1, 0, 0),
Note that behavior profile g * 1 , g * 2 , g * 3 on the first stage forms the network g * = {13}. Suppose that the cooperative solution concept is the core: CS C(V) = C(V), the core C(V) consists of 3-dimensional vectors (ξ 1 , ξ 2 , ξ 3 ) satisfying ξ 1 + ξ 2 + ξ 3 = 8, ξ 1 + ξ 2 6, ξ 1 + ξ 3 7, ξ 2 + ξ 3 2, ξ 1 1, ξ 2 1, ξ 3 1, or, equivalently:
The core C(V), plotted in barycentric coordinates, is shown in Fig. 1 (a) .
Consider now cooperation on the second stage of the game, provided that network g * = {13} on the first stage is fixed. Using The core C(v({13})), plotted in barycentric coordinates, is shown in Fig. 1 (b) . Since C(V) ⊂ C(v(g * )), the core C(V) is time-consistent cooperative solution concept in two-stage network games but it is obvious that the core C(V) is not strongly time-consistent (inclusion (9) does not hold).
Consider another cooperative solution concept-the τ-value 13 . In the cooperative two-stage network game the τ-value τ = (τ 1 , . . . , τ n ) is calculated as follows:
where M(V) = (M 1 (V), . . . , M n (V)), m(V) = (m 1 (V), . . . , m n (V)) such that:
